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Questions of constitutional design, that is, of structuring the political relationship 
between dominant and non-dominant communities, are recurrent across the globe. 
While the particular issues faced by each state are distinct, at their root lies a common 
problem: how should legal and political institutions and processes be designed to 
provide minority groups or peoples with the capacity to have their interests heard in 
the processes of government? In this paper, I explore how democratic theory 









1  Introduction 
 
The very essence of democratic governance consists in the absolute 
sovereignty of the majority…1 
 
I am an unashamed majoritarian. I think that the least bad procedure for 
resolving disagreements within a society…is to let the numbers count. More 
votes should beat fewer votes when it comes to difficult, contentious social 
policy decisions, even those about rights.2 
 
Questions of constitutional design—of structuring the political relationship between dominant 
and non-dominant communities—are recurrent across the globe. In the Middle East, minority 
communities have consistently proposed federalisation as a solution to years of internecine 
warfare. In Iraq, these efforts culminated in Article 1 of the 2005 Constitution, which for the 
first time defined the country as a federal state. More recently, in 2016 the Kurdish 
community of Northern Syria unilaterally declared the establishment of a federal system of 
government encompassing three self-governing cantons and styled the Democratic Federal 
System of Northern Syria.3 In North Africa, over two decades of civil war and around two 
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1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835) (Henry Reeve trans, OUP, New York, 1961) p. 182 (Ch 
XIV). 
2 J. Allan, ‘An Unashamed Majoritarian’, 27 Dalhousie Law Journal (2004) p. 538. 
3 ‘Syria Civil War: Kurds Declare Federal Region in North’, Al Jazeera, 18 March 2016 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/syria-civil-war-kurds-declare-federal-system-north-
160317111902534.html>.  
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million fatalities eventually led to the partition of Sudan, and independence of South Sudan,4 
though severe conflict has not abated. Partition is neither desirable nor feasible in Sri Lanka, 
where the country is drafting a new Constitution to ensure “all communities live in 
harmony”.5 Instead, President Maithripala Sirisena has suggested abolishing the powerful 
executive presidency and returning to a system of parliamentary democracy.6 This process 
may learn from the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, which instituted a new 
consociational democratic order aimed at “enhanc[ing] political and legal inclusiveness”.7 
 
While these challenges are felt most deeply in divided societies transitioning from 
authoritarianism or mass conflict, they also arise in consolidated liberal democracies.8 In 
Canada, asymmetric federalism provides Quebec with greater competencies and privileges 
than the other provinces, but the failure of the Charlottetown Accord has left many questions 
over the relationship between the state and First Nations and Métis peoples. Likewise, in the 
United Kingdom, recent amendments to the House of Commons Standing Orders requiring 
legislation only affecting England to be approved by an English Grand Committee prior to its 
Third Reading may have resolved the “West Lothian Question”,9 but is attacked by the 
Scottish National Party as “driving Scotland out of the door”.10 In Catalonia, dismay over a 
Constitutional Court decision declaring many provisions of the Statute of Autonomy 2006 
unconstitutional, catalysed the modern independence movement. Although that Court has 
subsequently found unilateral secession would be unlawful,11 Catalonia appears poised to 
hold a referendum on independence in 2017.12 Similarly, in Australia, debate continues over 
the proper constitutional relationship between the non-Indigenous majority and the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander minority. Despite broad popular support for amending the 
Constitution to ‘recognise’ Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples,13 there is still 
significant debate over the form recognition should take, what recognition means, and, 
indeed, whether a referendum to amend the Constitution will even be held.14  
 
In a 2008 edited collection exploring the challenge of managing ethnocultural diversity, Sujit 
Choudhry noted that failing to respond appropriately can have dangerous results, potentially 
leading to discrimination, forced assimilation, civil war, and even genocide. But even in the 
absence of violence, failing to manage ethnocultural diversity ‘can have a corrosive effect on 
                                                     
4 Ø. Rolandsen and M.W. Daly, A History of South Sudan: From Slavery to Independence (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2016).  
5 ‘Sri Lanka begins process of writing new constitution to prevent war’, DW, 9 January 2017 
<http://www.dw.com/en/sri-lanka-begins-process-of-writing-new-constitution-to-prevent-war/a-18968845>.  
6 Ibid. 
7 F. Ní Aoláin and C. Campbell, ‘The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies’, 27 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2005) p. 175. 
8 J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1996) p. 15. 
9 United Kingdom, Standing Orders of the House of Commons (2016) o. 83J. 
10 ‘“English votes” rules used for first time in House of Commons’, BBC News, 12 January 2016 
<www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-35295404>.  
11  ‘Spain court rules Catalonia independence votes illegal’, DW, 25 February 2015 
<http://www.dw.com/en/spain-court-rules-catalonia-independence-votes-illegal/a-18279028>. . 
12 A. Berwick and T. Cobos, ‘Catalonia to hold independence referendum with or without Spain’s consent’, 
Reuters, 28 September 2016 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-spain-catalonia-idUSKCN11Y2FR>.  
13 See e.g. M. Ford and C. Blumer’ ‘Vote Compass: Most Australians back constitutional recognition for 
Indigenous Australians’, ABC News, 20 May 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-05-20/vote-compass-
indigenous-recognition/7428030>.   
14 A. Henderson, ‘Timing of Indigenous constitutional recognition vote in 2017 pushed back’, ABC News, 9 
August 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-09/indigenous-recognition-vote-may-still-be-on-the-
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ordinary politics’, destabilising both social and institutional trust.15 In an era where faith in 
democratic institutions is falling and ethno-nationalism appears to be on the rise, it is vital that 
legal and political institutions channel diversity and disagreement in productive ways. While 
the precise questions faced by each state are distinct, at their root lies a common problem: 
how can constitutional design ensure that minority groups or peoples are heard in the 
processes of government?16 Formulating the question in this manner suggests that democratic 
theory may have something to offer. 
 
Democratic theory is a complex subset of political philosophy. It covers a broad range of 
questions, including definitional disputes over the metes and bounds of the concept, as well as 
its goals and obligations. Empirical democratic theorists analyse the functioning of 
democratic regimes in practice, exploring what institutions or decision-making rules are best 
suited to its operation; normative theorists question its moral foundations, examining whether 
democratic governance is desirable, and if so, how it can be justified; and, conceptual 
theorists seek to corral the animating ideals and central features of democracy to better define 
it. This paper operates on several of these levels, but my major focus is on exploring how 
democratic theorists—and democratic theory—respond to numerical minorities who 
constitute historically “marginalised ascriptive groups”17 seeking to have their interests heard 
in the processes of government.  
 
‘Marginalised ascriptive groups’ is a multifaceted term. It refers to communities based on 
hereditary identities, such as culture or ethnicity, and which, based on these identities, are 
excluded in some way from the broader society. Such social exclusion does not need to be 
total, but patterns of political and social inequality are nonetheless structured along the lines 
of group membership. As such, while particular individual members of these communities 
may not be prevented from participating fully in the economic, social, and political life of the 
society in which they live;18 the community as a whole is prevented from participating on the 
terms in which they choose to participate. They are “discrete and insular minorities”, who, 
while active and engaged in defence of their interests, “exist[] apart from political decision-
making”.19 In some cases, these communities, which differentiate themselves (and are 
differentiated) from members of the dominant community on the basis of ethnicity or culture, 
consider themselves sub-state national groups.20 In other cases, such marginalised groups seek 
to protect and promote their unique and distinctive interests from interference by the 
dominant community, but do not consider themselves to be a ‘nation’. Owing to these 
distinctions, throughout this article I refer to these communities in varying ways. What unites 
them for my purposes, however, is their status as an identifiable, marginalised community that 
constitutes a numerical minority within the state they reside.  
 
                                                     
15 S. Choudhry, ‘Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in 
Divided Societies’ in S. Choudhry (ed), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or 
Accommodation? (Oxford University Press, New York, 2008) p. 1, 5. 
16 This question is phrased from the state’s position and is relevant for accommodating numerical minorities who 
seek self-determination or greater autonomy not amounting to secession. 
17 M. Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalised Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998) p. 116. 
18 See I.M. Young, ‘Five Faces of Oppression’ in L. Heldke and P. O’Connor (eds), Oppression, Privilege, and 
Resistance (McGraw Hill, New York, 2004) pp. 35-49. 
19 J. Waldron, Political Political Theory (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2016) p. 242, citing United 
States v Carolene Products Co. 344 US 144 (1938) p. 152, n 4 (Stone J). 
20 In these cases it is more appropriate to speak of multiple peoples within the state. If secession is neither 
desirable nor feasible, similar questions of constitutional design will exist. 
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At one level, democracy appears to offer little for such numerical minorities. After all, 
popular accounts like those of Alexander de Tocqueville and James Allan cited above, 
associate the concept so closely with the principle of majority rule that it often seems to be 
inseparable. This relationship has a rich history in the Western tradition; Aristotle, for 
example, explained that any state where “the people are in the majority…will necessarily be a 
democracy”.21 But democracy is not simply majority rule; it is collective self-rule. Majority 
rule is merely a decision-making method that is ordinarily best suited to achieving collective 
self-rule. Indeed, as Part II will demonstrate, majoritarian processes necessarily presuppose 
the existence of a numerical minority. Where this numerical minority constitutes a 
marginalised ascriptive group, it may persistently find itself outvoted and its interests ignored. 
In these cases, collective self-rule is merely majority self-rule. Alternative—democratic—
arrangements should be devised.  
 
Part III examines eight alternative institutional arrangements proposed by democratic 
theorists. I divide these into three distinct approaches. First, many democratic theorists 
propose that the scope of majoritarian institutions’ decision-making power should be limited, 
with certain issues left to be decided by the subgroup itself, or an impartial technocratic body. 
A second theme argues that majority rule should be deemphasised and the idea of democracy 
reconceptualised away from the aggregation of preferences. Scholars working within this 
tradition argue that reasoned deliberation offers greater hope for the unique perspectives and 
interests of numerical minorities to be heard in the processes of government, but they differ as 
to whether this can be achieved via enhancing opportunities for citizens to contest 
government decisions, or establishing open participatory public forums where all voices may 
be heard. Finally, a third group of theorists recommend working within current representative 
systems, but tinkering around the edges to enhance the value of numerical minority groups’ 
voting power. Again, these scholars differ in their pronouncements, variously contending that 
electoral boundaries should be altered, additional votes provided, electoral systems amended, 
or a certain number of seats in the legislature reserved for members of the group.  
 
Each solution differs in form, but they are all grounded in a desire to ensure that the values 
and ideals of democracy—collective self-rule—are realised, and each offers valuable insight 
in exploring how numerical minorities may be heard in the processes of government. It is 
hoped that this taxonomy of institutional mechanisms for democratic participation will assist 
constitutional lawyers, democratic theorists, and policy makers in devising appropriate 
political structures for diverse situations across the globe. This may stem the recent slide 
towards dangerous nationalism, bolster faltering support for democracy around the world, and 
assist states reach workable arrangements that allow all of their citizens to be heard by 
government. Of course, two points should be borne in mind. First, no one mechanism is most 
suitable. In practice, states adopt a variety of such arrangements calibrated to their unique 
circumstances. Second, while institutional arrangements are necessary to ensure that minority 
interests are heard in the processes of government, they are not sufficient. Ultimately a 
political culture of inclusion and respect, an “ethos of engagement between multiple 
constituencies”,22 is necessary to breathe life into states composed of dominant and non-
dominant communities.    
 
 
                                                     
21 Aristotle, Politics (Carnes Lord trans, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013) p. 105 (Bk IV, Ch 4). 
22 W. Connolly, ‘The Liberal Image of the Nation’ in D. Ivison, P. Patton and W. Sanders (eds), Political Theory 
and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000) p. 183, 191. 
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2   Democracy as Collective Self-Rule  
 
Western democratic theorists, like de Tocqueville and Allan above, have long argued that 
democracy is inseparable from the principle of majority rule. John Locke, for example, simply 
assumed that democracy means majority rule when he explained that “a perfect democracy” is 
one where “the majority having…the whole power of the community naturally in them, may 
employ all that power in making laws for the community”.23 Rousseau and Mill adopted 
similar definitions, arguing respectively that under the social contract, “the vote of the 
majority always obligates all the others”,24 and that the ostensible object of democracy 
involves “giving the powers of government in all cases to the numerical majority”.25 This 
view retains some currency; in 1980, Hans Staub declared that “democracy is, by definition, 
government of the majority”,26 and, four years later, Elaine Spitz remarked that “it is hard to 
imagine who else might make such decisions”.27 
 
However, while majority rule is intertwined with the concept of democracy, it is conceptually 
distinct. Majority rule is merely a decision-making method; it does not subsume the concept 
of democracy itself.28 Indeed, even the “unashamed majoritarian” James Allan, believes that 
“the essence of democracy is self-government by the people”.29 This is a crucial point. For 
while democracy may be an “essentially contested concept”,30 at its root lays a simple idea: 
the people rule collectively. This much is clear etymologically; as a term ‘democracy’ 
originates from the Greek dēmokratía, or ‘rule of the people’, itself a portmanteau of demos 
(people) and kratos (power).31 Rule of the people is thus distinct from other forms of 
government, such as oligarchia (rule of the few) and monarkhíā (rule of one). Collective self-
rule has two attributes: influence and control. All of the people (not just a few) must be able 
to have a say in government in a manner that allows them to impose a direction on that 
government.32 That is, all citizens should be able, if they so wish, to exert meaningful 
influence on public policy, to “shape the social context in which they live”,33 such that the 
government reflects the interests of all citizens and is responsive to changes in those interests. 
As David Held recognises, democracy is governance “accountable to citizens”.34 
                                                     
23 J. Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Hackett Publishing, first published 1689, Indianapolis, 1980 ed) p. 
68 (Ch X [132]). 
24 J-J. Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings: On the Social Contract (Douglas Cress trans, Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis, 2nd ed, 2011) p, 227 (trans of of: Du contrat social ou principes du droit politique (first published 
1762)] (Bk IV Ch 2).  
25 J.S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Parker, Son, and Bourn, London, 1861) p. 163 (Ch 
7). 
26 H. Staub, ‘The Tyranny of Minorities’, 109 Daedalus (1980) p. 159. 
27 E. Spitz, Majority Rule (Chatham House, Chatham, 1984) p. 203. See also H. Arendt, On Revolution (Faber & 
Faber, London, 1963) p. 164: majority decision is ‘a technical device likely to be adopted almost automatically’. 
28 A. Sen, ‘Democracy as a Universal Value’, 10 Journal of Democracy (1999) p. 8. 
29 J. Allan, ‘Oh that I were made Judge in the Land’, 30 Federal Law Review (2002) p. 575. 
30 W.B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’ 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1955) p. 183. 
31 See generally R. Collier, ‘Demos’ in P.B. Clarke and J. Foweraker (eds), Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought 
(Routledge, London, 2001). 
32 P. Pettit, On the People’s Terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2012) p. 22. 
33 T. Pogge, ‘Creating supra-national institutions democratically: Reflections on the European Union’s 
“Democratic Deficit”’ 5 The Journal of Political Philosophy (1997) p. 179.  
34 J-P. Gagnon, ‘An Interview with Professor David Held: Exploring the Concepts of Cosmopolitanism and 
Democracy’ 1 Democratic Theory (2011) p. 1. See also P. Schmitter and T.L. Karl, ‘What Democracy is…and is 
not’ 2 Journal of Democracy (1991) p. 76. In modern representative democracies, it is the act of electing 
members of Parliament that the voter exerts her will and holds her representative accountable: H. Pitkin, The 
Concept of Representation (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967) p. 43. 
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Josiah Ober’s reconstruction of the original Greek understanding of democracy supports this 
broad interpretation. Ober argues that ancient Greek accounts did not centre on the peoples’ 
“monopolistic control of pre-existing constitutional authority”, but as a regime in which “the 
demos gains a collective capacity to effect change in the public realm”.35 Democracy as “the 
empowered demos”,36 means that all the people, from “the poorest he that is in England” to 
“the greatest he”37—not just a majority—must have a capacity to act. Reducing democracy to 
a voting-rule therefore “elides much of the value and potential of democracy”.38 
 
To say that democracy requires collective self-rule is not to say that collective self-rule comes 
in a single form, rather, it can be instrumentalised in diverse ways. It may take the form of a 
federal state with a bicameral legislature and elected executive, or a unitary state with a 
unicameral legislature and executive responsible to that legislative branch. Members of the 
judiciary might be elected rather than appointed, while vice versa, members of one legislative 
chamber may be appointed, not elected; voting may or may not be compulsory; and, the 
power of government may be controlled by a single written constitution or a series of 
uncodified statutes and political conventions. Notwithstanding these significant discrepancies, 
so long as all of the people have a collective capacity to influence government, collective self-
rule is realised. Allan accepts this, he simply believes that “letting the numbers count”,39 is 
ordinarily “the least bad procedure”40 for ensuring that government is accountable to citizens 
and therefore, for securing collective self-rule. 
 
2.1  Majority Rule and Numerical Minorities 
I am generally in agreement with Allan. As a decision-making method, majority rule has 
definite advantages. Social choice theorists have demonstrated that, between two alternatives, 
majority rule is the only decision-making procedure which satisfies four relevant conditions. 
It is: decisive—regardless of preference distribution there is always a clear winner; 
anonymous—the identity of each voter is immaterial; neutral—both outcomes are treated the 
same as reversing each individual preference reverses the group preference; and, positively 
responsive—a tied decision can be reversed by one voter changing their preference ordering.41 
No other collective decision-making rule satisfies these four conditions: unanimity rule 
violates decisiveness; weighted majority rule violates anonymity; and supra-majority rule 
violates neutrality and positive responsiveness (if weighted towards the status quo).42 Putting 
to one-side issues of preference cycling and additional alternatives,43 majority rule expresses 
                                                     
35 J. Ober, ‘The Original Meaning of “Democracy”: Capacity to do things, not Majority Rule’ 15 Constellations 
(2008) p. 7. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Colonel Rainborough in the Putney Debates, 1647: C. Firth (ed), Sir William Clarke, The Clarke Papers 
(Camden Society, London, 1901) Vol I, p. 301. 
38 Ober, supra note 35, p. 3. 
39 J. Allan, ‘Siren Songs and Myths in the Bill of Rights Debate’ 49 Papers on Parliament (2008) p. 5. 
40 Allan, supra note 2, p. 538 (emphasis added).  
41 K. May, ‘A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decisions’ 20 
Econometrica (1952) p. 680.  
42 N. Miller, ‘Majority Rule and Minority Interests’ in I. Shapiro and R. Hardin (eds) Political Order: Nomos 
XXXVIII (New York University Press, New York, 1996) p. 207, 215; H. Kelsen, ‘On the Essence and Value of 
Democracy’ in A. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds), Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 2000) p. 84, 86. 
43 K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1951). Cf .G. Mackie, 
Democracy Defended (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
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the fundamental political equality of citizens,44 as well as maximising the number of people 
who exercise self-rule,45 and, epistemically, potentially leads to better outcomes.46  
 
All political communities need a decision-rule by which preferences are aggregated into 
collective choice,47 and majority rule is ordinarily the least bad procedure. But this is different 
from saying that it is always the least bad procedure, or that majority rule will always secure 
collective self-rule. The problem is that majority rule necessarily presupposes the existence of 
a minority. This poses a conundrum for democratic theory, for in these circumstances how 
can we say that the outvoted exercise self-rule? For democratic theorists like Rousseau, this 
question never eventuates, as people are not asked whether they approve of a legislative 
proposal, but whether it conforms to the “general will”, the common and objective 
“indestructible”48 “will of the people”. As Rousseau explained, “when…the opinion contrary 
to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in error, and that what I took to be the general 
will was not so”;49 although I have been outvoted, I remain “as free as before” because I am 
ruling myself, having placed myself “under the supreme direction of the general will”.50 
However, even Rousseau acknowledged that in some cases the numerical majority may 
incorrectly ascertain the general will, and so introduced the mythical “Legislator” who 
seemingly has superior access to the content of the general will and is responsible for 
persuading citizens to mould their wills into conformity with reason.51 In a diverse and 
heterogeneous society without an omniscient, Platonic philosopher king, the general will is 
not ascertainable.52 If we dismiss the notion then that the will of the majority is the will of 
all,53 majority rule appears to offer little for numerical minorities who are reduced to “political 
losers”.54  
 
                                                     
44 N. Riemer, ‘The Case for Bare Majority Rule’ 62 Ethics (1951) p. 17; J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) pp. 114-15; W. Sadurski, Equality and Legitimacy (Oxford 
University Press, London, 2008) Ch 2; J. Waldron, ‘A Majority in the Lifeboat’ 90 Boston University Law 
Review (2010) p. 1055.  
45 Kelsen, supra note 42, pp. 87-88. 
46 See e.g. M. de Condorcet, ‘Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of Decision-Making’ in K 
Baker (ed), Condorcet: Selected Writings (Macmillan Press, New York, 1976) pp. 48-49; L. Hong and S. Page, 
‘Groups of Diverse Problem Solvers Can Outperform Groups of High-Ability Problem Solvers’ 101 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2004) p. 1635; H. Landemore, Democratic Reason: Politics, 
Collective Intelligence, and the Rule of the Many (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2012). Cf. J. Brennan, 
Against Democracy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016) pp. 172-203. 
47 Miller, supra note 42, p. 213. 
48 Rousseau, supra note 24, p. 224 (Bk IV Ch 1). 
49 Ibid., p. 227 (Bk IV Ch 2). 
50 Ibid., p. 164 (Bk 1 Ch 6).  
51 Ibid., p. 180 (Bk II Ch VI). See further H. Fireside, ‘The Concept of the Legislator in Rousseau’s Social 
Contract’ 32 The Review of Politics (1970) p. 192. 
52 Nadia Urbinati argues that Rousseau’s conception is only plausible within a homogenous demos: N. Urbinati, 
Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2006) pp. 44, 136. 
53 A position ably expressed by E.J. Sieyès, Political Writings (M. Sonenscher trans, Hackett Publishing, 
Indianapolis, 2003) pp. 39-40 [trans of Vues sur les moyens d'exécution dont les représentants de la France 
pourront dispose en 1789 (first published, 1789) the general interest is ‘one interest among the various 
individual interests that is common to the largest number of voters’. Despite drawing on Rousseau for his 
conception of democracy, Kelsen refers to this idea as a ‘fiction’: Kelsen, supra note 42, p. 101. See also P. 
Pettit, ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization’ in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds), 
Democracy’s Value (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999) p. 163, 177. 
54 C. Anderson et al, Losers’ Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2005) p. 2.  
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‘So what?’ Allan might ask. ‘That is democracy’. This is true. Absent unanimity or consensus 
decision-making (a form of decision-making adopted by many Indigenous communities),55 
some number of people will be ‘political losers’ in any and every decision. If democracy is, as 
Joseph Schumpeter’s seminal definition would have it, nothing more than an “institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”,56 then no normative weight 
should be accorded to the existence or policy preference of electoral minorities.  
 
Democratic theorists are not entirely unreceptive to the concern of electoral minorities. After 
all, if electoral minorities lose faith in the democratic system, they may choose not to take part 
in democratic institutions, and perhaps even choose to subvert them. The viability and 
continuation of democratic systems therefore depends, in part, on the losers’ consent.57 This 
requires a Rawlsian “overlapping consensus”,58 or a “sense of belonging together”,59 within 
the society, such that all persons “feel that they are part of the same destiny and have a share 
in the same general public”,60 but it also necessitates institutional forms that empower 
electoral minorities in some manner, such as through the principle of the loyal opposition.61 
Such mechanisms are intended to ensure that a temporary political majority does not 
undermine the democratic process to prevent today’s electoral losers from becoming 
tomorrow’s electoral winners.62 But is this the case? Can numerical minorities become 
persistent electoral minorities, and how do democratic theorists deal with these cases? 
 
2.2  Do Persistent Electoral Minorities Exist? 
Pluralist democratic theorists have traditionally discounted the existence of persistent 
electoral minorities. For Robert Dahl, in “a large and pluralistic society” majorities are “likely 
to be unstable and transitory” and therefore “politically ineffective”.63 Rather, “constantly 
shifting constellations of various minority interests”64 will coalesce around certain issues 
before breaking apart and rearranging themselves on other issues. As such, on “matters of 
specific policy” a majority “rarely, if ever, rule[s]”; fear of majority rule is therefore “founded 
                                                     
55 See e.g. I. Watson, Raw Law (Routledge, London, 2015) p. 17; K. Horn-Miller, ‘What does Indigenous 
Participatory Democracy Look Like? Kahnawà:ke’s Community Decision Making Process’ 18 Review of 
Constitutional Studies (2013) pp. 116-118. 
56 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942) p. 269. 
57 R. Nadeau and A. Blais, ‘Accepting the Election Outcome: The Effect of Participation on Losers’ Consent’ 23 
British Journal of Political Science (1993) p. 553; Anderson et al, supra note 54, p. 13.  
58 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993) p. 165. See also M. Keating, 
Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era (Oxford University Press, New York,, 
2001) p. 8. 
59 A. Mason, ‘Political Community, Liberal-Nationalism and the Ethics of Assimilation’ 109 Ethics (1999) p. 
266. 
60 Urbinati, supra note 52, p. 136.  
61 On loyal opposition see Waldron, supra note 19, pp. 93-124. On the need for counter-majoritarian 
mechanisms see: R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956) p. 36; 
J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press, Boston, 1980) pp. 
73, 87; I. Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003) p. 76. Aristotle, 
supra note 21, p. 106 (Bk IV Ch 4); J. Madison, Federalist No. 51 (1788) in D. Wootton (ed), The Essential 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers (Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 2003) pp. 248-9.  
62 I. Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010) p. 20; E. 
Latham ‘The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a Theory’ 46 American Political Science Review (1952) p. 391.  
63 Dahl, supra note 61, p. 30.  
64 R. Pildes, ‘Democracy and the Representation of Minority Interests’ in F. Bastida (ed), Fundamentos: La 
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upon a misconception of the probabilities permitted by political reality”.65 David Tubman also 
emphasises the “protean complex of crisscrossing relationships” and the “notion of multiple 
or overlapping membership” that characterise modern society. In view of this social fact, and 
“the diversity of an individual’s activities and his attendant interests”, Tubman argues, “no 
single group affiliation accounts for all of the attitudes or interests of any individual except a 
fanatic or a compulsive neurotic”.66 Hans Kelsen made a similar point, arguing that majority 
rule incentivises minority groups to overcome “the numerous forces within society that drive 
it into divisions and ruptures”, amalgamate, and secure electoral victory.67 If a majority truly 
acts as a dictator and condemns a minority “to irrelevance”, Kelsen believes the minority 
group would renounce its “participation in the formation of the will of the community”, 
“depriv[ing] the majority…of its very character”.68 For these theorists then, the problem of 
persistent electoral minorities simply does not arise; no person is denied self-rule because, on 
specific policy proposals, all members of society take turns being ruler and ruled.69  
 
Simple majority rule does not necessarily make intensity of policy preferences visible.70 For 
example, A, B, and C may prefer P1 > P2, while D may prefer P2 > P1. This does not, 
however, tell us how important P1 or P2 is for each individual or group; A, B, and C may 
marginally prefer P1, while P2 may be vitally important for D. In a situation where A, B, C 
and D all have one vote, P1 will be enacted, as it commands the broadest support. But, if D is 
particularly engaged and animated (or if voting is not compulsory), it may be able to trade-off 
support for other policies (P3, P4, etc.) to ensure P2 is adopted. Democratic theorists are 
particularly concerned about this common feature of the democratic process,71 as it appears to 
indicate that rather than tyranny of the majority, it is tyranny of an intense minority and an 
apathetic majority that should most concern committed democrats.72  
 
In some respects, these theorists are correct. In the United States, the rise of party activists 
and intra-party participatory nominating processes, has contributed to the selection of more 
ideologically extreme candidates.73 Likewise, declining party membership in Australia and 
the United Kingdom has pushed political parties to experiment with more open and 
participatory candidate selection policies in order to mitigate the influence of factional 
groups.74 At the same time, despite some research questioning the effectiveness of lobbying,75 
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interest groups continue to spend vast sums seeking to exert policy or legislative change.76 
Successful efforts, like the mining industry’s campaign against the Australian Labor 
Government’s resource super profits tax,77 or successive failure to achieve healthcare reform 
in the United States,78 suggest that committed minority groups are capable of influencing 
significant change.  
 
Likewise, in recent years, a number of scholars exploring the political impact of income 
inequality have explained how electoral democracies fail to adequately facilitate collective 
self-rule. Rather, empirical evidence suggests that elected officials are more likely to be 
accessible and responsive to the views of a minority of affluent constituents rather than all 
citizens.79 John McCormick’s reconstruction of Machiavelli as a theorist of popular 
democracy, concerned with extra-electoral checks to constrain socio-economic elites and 
enable those “most vulnerable to participate in collective decisions”,80 indicates that this 
dynamic was perhaps better understood in earlier times.81 As Machiavelli presciently noted, 
“the [privileged] few always behave in the mode of the few”.82 This is a concerning 
development and care should be taken to ensure that the economically marginalised are able 
to participate in collective decisions on the same level as wealthier citizens. Restrictions on 
campaign finance legislation and political donations laws are a first step in equalising the 
playing field.83 Nonetheless, while McCormick’s intervention is helpful, his class-based 
cleavage too readily accepts ‘the people’ as a homogenous unit (a critique McCormick makes 
at contemporary constitutionalists),84 and elides significant distinctions within this 
heterogeneous group.  
 
This blindness is not uncommon.85 Iris Marion Young has critiqued political philosophers for 
failing to comprehend the concept of the social group, instead conceiving it either as an 
aggregate or association, “both of which are methodologically individualist concepts”.86 The 
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aggregate model reduces a social group to “a mere set of attributes”, red hair, blue eyes, black 
skin, etc., while the association model sees individuals as constituting groups, implicitly 
treating the individual “as ontologically prior to the collective”.87 The cross-cutting interests 
identified by Dahl, Tubman, Kelsen and others, accords with this approach. Each scholar 
recognises interest groups not social groups. The atomistic individual may have a range of 
policy preferences and associate with other individuals to advocate for those preferences, but 
a social group is not simply a collection or aggregation of people, for it is “more 
fundamentally intertwined with the identities of the people described as belonging to them” 
and is defined “by a sense of identity”.88 According to Young, social groups “constitute 
individuals”, for “a person’s particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, 
even…mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or 
his group affinities”;89 “they differentiate themselves from or are differentiated by at least one 
other group according to these cultural forms”.90 Melissa Williams agrees with Young’s 
definition of social groups, and contrasts it with pluralist political theorists’ interest groups. 
For Williams, membership in a “marginalised ascriptive group” is radically different from 
membership in an interest group: “it is involuntary, immutable, and dichotomous, whereas 
membership in an interest group is voluntary, shifting, and a matter of degree”.91 
 
Elucidation of the distinctions between interest groups and social groups highlights the flawed 
approach of democratic theorists who contend that persistent electoral minorities do not exist 
in democracies. For example, the precarious demographic position of most Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples within the Australian settler-state weakens their ability to 
effectively participate in the democratic system and influence its institutions towards their 
aspirations.92 Indigenous leaders lament feelings of disempowerment and alienation from the 
governmental process, Indigenous policy makers document their concern over the democratic 
deficit within the sector, and Indigenous aspirations and demands are all-too-often either 
relegated or ignored entirely by majoritarian processes.93 Similar complaints are levied by 
numerical minorities who constitute marginalised communities across the globe.  
 
Of course, sometimes the political system does work for numerical minorities, and they can 
protect themselves by emphasising ties that bind the interests of the dominant community to 
their own. But intermittent (partial) success is often met with significant political backlash. To 
continue the Australian example, enactment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), which created 
a narrow but clear legal pathway for Indigenous groups to ensure Australian law respects and 
protects their property rights over their traditional land, was followed by “bucketloads of 
extinguishment”,94 and the promised social justice package remains illusory. This is not to 
denigrate the many committed members of minority groups who agitate to have their 
distinctive interests heard in the processes of government, or to dismiss their effort. It is 
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merely acknowledging that brute demography means the system is structured against them; 
they “cannot protect themselves in [majoritarian] politics”.95   
 
As feminist theorists have warned in relation to gender, however, it is necessary to avoid the 
trap of essentialising members of minority communities.96 All groups are heterogeneous, with 
a wide diversity of political values and worldviews. Just as Dahl argued, not all members will 
be electoral losers on every issue. Nonetheless, among this diversity of interests, 
commonalities of culture, background and experience, particularly experience as a minority 
group within the larger polity, draws members together, and it is on law and policy 
fragmented along, for example, Sinhalese-Tamil, Francophone-Anglophone, pakeha-Māori, 
Catalan-Castilian or Aboriginal-non-Aboriginal lines, that this cleavage poses problems. But 
assuming members of the minority group do not subvert the state’s democratic institutions, is 
this a problem for democracy?  
 
2.3 Persistent Electoral Minorities and Political Legitimacy 
Consideration of persistent electoral minorities poses a challenge to procedural or 
instrumental accounts of democratic theory. If democracy is merely an “institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions”,97 then questioning whether the policy 
preferences of an elector are enacted asks the wrong question. All that should matter is that 
the political resources are distributed equally, that every person has one vote. As I have noted, 
however, democracy is more than a decision-making rule, and while democracies can come in 
many shapes and sizes they all must be structured so as to ensure collective (and not merely 
majority) self-rule. Majority decision is very likely to be the presumptive decision-making 
method, but institutional arrangements must exist to empower numerical minorities. Where 
persistent electoral minorities exist, undifferentiated majority rule will be inappropriate.   
 
A number of democratic theorists recognise the paucity of the instrumental account. Anna 
Stilz argues that a fundamental condition of democracy entails the government looking out for 
the basic interests of all of its citizens, not just a subset. Where a majority routinely ignores 
the interests of a minority it acts illegitimately.98 Equally, Thomas Christiano contends that 
the idea that “the democratic process confers legitimacy on the outcomes of the decision-
making process” is rocked by the existence of “persistent minorities”.99 Drawing on the 
notion of public equality, Christiano argues that proceduralist accounts do “not take 
sufficiently seriously the very interests that individuals have in having a say in their 
society”.100 As a persistent minority “lacks the means for effecting law and policy”,101 their 
ability to play a role in shaping their society is diminished, a problem that the group “could 
not fail to be aware” of.102 Though they may enjoy all of the formal-legal privileges of 
citizenship, their position ensures they remain “functionally excluded from the political 
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process, and thus effectively excluded from the life of the ‘true’ political community”.103 
Reflecting on these positions, Jeff Spinner-Halev has argued that the existence of persistent 
minorities “does not necessarily make a state illegitimate, but it does raise the possibility of 
partial legitimacy”.104  
 
This notion of partial legitimacy can be illuminated further by exploring the conceptual 
distinctions between majority tyranny and persistent electoral minorities, for although these 
terms describe very different pathologies, the consequences for the legitimacy of the 
democratic state are similar. Tyranny of the majority involves the arbitrary interference in the 
lives of a minority, in vicious and systemic ways. Conversely, persistent electoral minorities 
may be subject to decisions of a principled and egalitarian majority whom takes the 
minority’s interests into account and enacts policies that they consider beneficial for the 
minority. While this latter case is clearly preferable, it remains problematic, as it is likely that 
the majority acts under its own conception of the minority’s interests, which may differ 
substantially.105 Even in these cases, the majority has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary 
basis in certain choices that the minority is in a position to make.106 This point demonstrates 
that persistent electoral minorities will only be able to exercise collective self-rule if they are 
able to influence and direct government; that is, if their interests are heard in the processes of 
government. Recognising that at its root, democracy means collective self-rule reveals this 
problem and leads us to consider institutional reform. 
 
 
3 How Can Persistent Electoral Minorities Be Heard? 
 
Majority rule may be deeply associated with democracy, but it is conceptually distinct. If 
democracy means the collective self-rule of the people, majority rule is merely an instrument 
towards that goal;107 and “there is no reason to think that there is one best rule of collective 
decision”.108 Rather, different rules may be more or less appropriate for different activities, 
depending on the nature of the participants and the issues involved.109 The “creative 
challenge” that some democratic theorists have taken up, is to develop processes that enhance 
the ability of marginalised ascriptive groups’ to have their interests heard in the processes of 
government, “in ways that are more, rather than less, compatible with democracy.”110  
 
This Part provides a taxonomy of eight institutional attempts to achieve this goal. They can be 
broadly categorised into three alternative approaches. The first argues that the scope of 
majoritarian institutions’ decision-making power should be limited, with certain issues left to 
be decided by the group itself, or an impartial technocratic body that makes decisions on the 
basis of some objective standard. The second suggests that aggregative democracy is per se 
unsuitable for states with persistent electoral minorities, and representative institutions should 
be transformed into sites of reasoned deliberation or forums of contestation to enable 
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members of such groups to be heard. The third accepts majority rule as a preferable decision-
making method, but aims at enhancing the voice of marginalised ascriptive groups within 
representative institutions by amending electoral machinery.   Although each form of minority 
inclusion explores this issue from a distinctive angle, they all reflect an understanding that 
democracy requires all voices to be heard in the processes of government. In this sense, each 
seeks to instrumentalise a different understanding of collective self-rule. Of course, 
institutional alterations are a necessary but not sufficient criterion for change; ultimately 
cultural change is required to ensure that the majority will heed that voice.111   
 
3.1 Limiting the Scope of Majoritarian Decision-Making Power 
A common approach to protecting and promoting the interests of marginalised ascriptive 
groups involves restraining the scope of majoritarian institutions’ decision-making power to 
preclude its operation within areas of particular concern of such groups. Decisions over 
certain issues are either taken out of the political sphere and placed in the hands of impartial, 
technocratic or managerial bodies, or removed to smaller, autonomous political subunits. 
While each approach aims to “alleviate the vulnerability of minority cultures to majority 
decisions,”112 the means embraced vary substantially. In the former case, the voices of all 
ordinary citizens are excised from the deliberative body, while in the latter circumstance a 
numerical minority is permitted to decide certain issues for itself.  In this case, the extent of 
voice is significant, as the numerical minority is entitled to full decision-making power over 
certain areas, and a guaranteed voice in the central government.  
 
3.1.1 Technocratic Democracy   
Constitutional or statutory provisions that channel decision-making (and not merely dispute 
resolution) away from majoritarian bodies towards impartial bureaucratic, administrative or 
managerial bodies are common throughout the world, though they are not necessarily 
conceived as protecting marginalised communities. Rather, they are often seen as a response 
to the increasing complexity of governance and consequent requisite technological expertise 
required to understand and develop sound public policy,113 or a reaction against delay and 
compromise inherent to political bargaining.114 Nonetheless, in inhibiting the ‘passions’ of the 
people, aspects of technocratic democracy have been promoted as enhancing the capacity of 
marginalised groups to have their interests heard.  
 
The rise of technocratic democracy is identified primarily in the global shift of monetary and 
banking policy from elected representatives to bodies staffed by unelected economists. In 
Canada, the Bank of Canada is responsible for regulating credit and currency “in the best 
interests of the economic life of the nation” and “promot[ing] the economic and financial 
welfare” of the country,115 all tasks that prior to 1938 were undertaken by government. The 
Canadian approach is not unique: central banks in most developed nations are structured so as 
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to be independent from political interference.116 In some cases, technocratic elements have 
penetrated further into the political domain. In Latin America, for instance, the appointment 
of economic technocrats to key state positions began in the 1980s and accelerated with 
neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. The power of these technocrats varies across states, but 
research suggests that they have been successful in advancing their own policy preferences, 
significantly altering institutional arrangements and the distribution of resources across 
society, even when it conflicts with the position of a democratically elected government.117 
As Miguel Centeno and Patricio Silva have remarked, in some cases, democratic regimes 
have been usurped by “technocratic democracies” where elected representatives have 
“nominal control” but the “framing of policy alternatives is largely in the hands of experts”.118 
In some extreme cases, unelected leaders have been appointed to head executive governments 
to stabilise the country during a crisis. Most recently, in Greece, economist Lucas Papademos 
led a Provisional Government from 11 November 2011 to 17 May 2012; in Italy, economist 
Mario Monti served as Prime Minister from 16 November 2011 to 21 December 2012.  
 
Technocracy is discernible in other areas. Ran Hirschl, among others, has identified a global 
trend towards “judicialisation of politics”, whereby contentious public policy issues and core 
moral predicaments are increasingly transferred from representative institutions to 
judiciaries.119 While this shift is complex and multifaceted, a “widely-held”120 thesis attributes 
it to a growing desire to legally protect minority groups from ‘majority tyranny’ via 
constitutionalism, bills of rights and muscular judicial review. In this reading, the judiciary, 
and not the parliament or the people themselves, is the “appropriate fora” for making key 
decisions because it is more impartial and reputable.121 In some respects, empirical evidence 
supports these claims. Even in Australia, a state without a Bill of Rights, proponents can point 
to celebrated judicial decisions restraining majority domination,122 or righting a historical 
wrong long-avoided by elected representatives.123 Nevertheless, many scholars remain 
unconvinced;124 the judiciary can be as unreceptive to minority claims as any legislature.125    
 
Judgments about impartiality and honesty are central for advocates of technocracy, who 
elevate ‘reason’ as the primary basis for authority, and seek to redefine moral or political 
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problems as technical.126 But such an approach is ultimately quixotic: not all public policy 
decisions concerning the political relationship between majority and minority communities 
are, nor can be made, value free. Rather, policymaking must be political; it must be 
legitimised by popular support.127 This central fact of political life derails technocracy as an 
approach for mediating the relationship between majoritarian democracy and marginalised 
groups, but it also disrupts more moderate technocratic approaches that acknowledge the 
existence of ethical value judgments, but, by seeking consensus within an epistemic 
community, still strive to transmute such judgments into objective, factual 
pronouncements.128 For, as a democrat might inquire: who is this epistemic community?  
 
Indeed, this question raises a further problem with technocracy generally: the notion that 
technocratic experts do not have their own interests. As Martin Shapiro has explained, “the 
very specialisation of knowledge required” to become an expert, “render[s] them non-
representative of the demos as a whole”.129 It is likely then, that ‘value-free’ technocratic 
standards may distribute scarce benefits unevenly across interest groups. Where this 
distribution is not grounded in popular support, or cannot be effectively challenged by those 
disadvantaged, collective self-rule is inhibited. This risk is intensified in circumstances where 
an epistemic community is composed of an ethno-cultural majority who cannot comprehend 
the distinctive concerns raised by an ethno-cultural minority. This problem is particularly 
pronounced when Indigenous aspirations are marginalised by equality principles situated 
within human rights acts.130 In these cases it seems necessary that the numerically smaller 
Indigenous community is able to decide the issue for themselves.  
 
3.1.2 Federalism 
Federalism is a system of government that combines both “shared rule and self-rule”,131 by 
dividing powers between two or more constituent entities, described as states, provinces, or 
regions, and a central government. It is often adopted by countries with a large territorially, 
linguistically or ethnically fragmented population, or as a result of a “federal bargain” 
between historically sovereign political communities.132 Federalism takes various institutional 
forms, dependent on the precise distribution of powers between its constituent members, and 
offers real benefits for numerically small marginalised ascriptive communities. In particular, 
it does not merely offer such groups an opportunity to be heard in the processes of 
government, but an opportunity to be the government.  
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Federalism is inherently “demos-constraining” as it divides competencies between the 
constituent entities.133 This institutional form protects individuals from abuse by the majority, 
and enables members within the substate community to have their interests heard in the 
central government’s decision-making body. Section 7 of the Australian Constitution, for 
instance, guarantees “equal representation” of each state, regardless of population size, 
ensuring that the interests of Tasmanians are heard in the processes of government, 
notwithstanding their small population. Nonetheless, while federalism operates as an 
institutional constraint to undifferentiated majority rule, its most significant element is that it 
enables individuals, communities and peoples to find political expression in multiple 
manifestations.134 Just as this aspect enhances the opportunity for Tasmanians to involve 
themselves in political decision-making, it has the potential to accommodate numerical 
minorities who consider themselves national groups and wish to preserve their identity. 
 
Liberal political theorists are increasingly receptive to the distinctiveness of ethno-cultural 
minorities, and accept that in some instances a form of partial veto power, achieved via 
federalism, may be appropriate. This shift first occurred in the early 1990s, as scholars 
acknowledged that the liberal democratic state’s claim of ethno-cultural neutrality is a 
“myth”,135 noting that public policy decisions relating to, for example, language and civic 
holidays, are not value free, but reflect attitudes of the dominant cultural group.136 Drawing 
on the significance of identity and membership, Yael Tamir and, Will Kymlicka, among 
others, argued that the state should respect the wishes of ethno-cultural minorities to preserve 
their identity and culture, because such membership is an important and constitutive element 
of personal identity.137 A person’s “societal culture” provides a complete context of choice, 
“determin[ing] the boundaries of the imaginable,”138 and offering a range of meaningful 
options “across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, 
recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres”.139 As a result 
of the “disintegrating effects”140 of the choices of the dominant cultural community, the state 
should ensure that minority societal cultures are protected.141 
 
Disagreement arises, however, over the form that legal and political institutions and processes 
to protect ethno-cultural minorities, should take. Tamir argues in favour of regional 
organisations, local autonomies and consociationalism,142 a form of corporatism along social, 
ethnic, or religious lines,143 while Kymlicka draws a distinction between Indigenous peoples 
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and other ethno-cultural minorities. For Kymlicka, Indigenous peoples are entitled to self-
government rights, whereas other minorities are granted a more limited set of polyethnic 
rights, which are “intended to promote integration into the larger society, not self-
government”.144 More recently, Siobhan Harty and Michael Murphy draw on these liberal 
nationalist scholars, but shy away from grounding self-determination in cultural 
distinctiveness, instead emphasising its connection to democracy and a people’s “democratic 
right to be self-governing”.145 A similar approach is taken by Steven Curry who grounds the 
legitimacy of government on popular sovereignty.146  
 
These approaches appear positive, but are they limited to territorially-concentrated ethno-
cultural numerical minorities? Not necessarily. Federalism divides competencies between 
different entities that share the same territorial space, but there is no need—as the Ottoman 
millet system evidences—to define the constitutive entities on the basis of geography.147 In 
the 1890s, Austro-Hungarian scholar Karl Renner proposed grounding autonomy on 
personality not territoriality.148 Like contemporary liberal nationalists, Renner’s approach 
distinguishes between the state as “a sovereign territorial entity”, and a nation as “a cultural 
community”.149 As Ephraim Nimni explains, the idea behind Renner’s model was to enable 
autonomous ethno-cultural communities to organise “as sovereign collectives whatever their 
residential location within a multinational state.”150 In contrast to the Ottoman approach, 
however, under Renner’s model, the autonomous communities would be based on individual 
consent.151 
 
Diana Meyers’ solution also avoids the territorial problem while paying attention to the 
particular values and aspirations of ethno-cultural minorities. Conscious of the risk 
untrammelled democracy poses to these groups, Meyers would qualify majority rule on issues 
that “are integral to [a person’s] individual identities…as well as personal or moral positions 
that are anathema to them”, but permit majority rule to decide questions that affect a person’s 
“annexed” qualities, that is “personal commitments and moral beliefs that are peripheral, but 
not alien to [a person’s] individual identities”.152 Though Meyers’ account is intended to 
defend counter-majoritarian principles, her approach is only feasible in a situation 
characterised by general societal agreement on a hierarchy of values, and it is not at all clear 
how this position can be institutionalised where the very dispute concerns the centrality of a 
person’s values. Does the French state’s commitment to secularism allow a majoritarian 
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parliament to ban distinctive items of dress worn by religious minorities?153 Is the decision to 
wear a burqa integral to a person’s identity, or merely a peripheral personal commitment? 
Meyers’ approach does not provide any answers to these questions.   
 
This same flaw is present in Dirk Jorke’s recent proposal to grant temporary veto power over 
certain legislation to socially disadvantaged groups. Concerned that the interests of 
economically marginalised groups are not heard in government, Jorke suggests that on 
“extremely” controversial acts “which aim to reshape the social structure of the society”, 
socially disadvantaged individuals should be permitted a chance to veto the legislation via an 
optional referendum. This veto power is highly circumscribed, however, as it merely 
postpones the implementation of the act to permit parliament to consider the decision anew.154 
Jorke conceives this device as ensuring that members of less-privileged groups “are heard to a 
larger extent than at present, but not necessarily to grant them more influence than others”.155 
In this, Jorke avoids Pettit’s general critique of partial veto power mechanisms, as the socially 
disadvantaged are not entitled to negate public decisions, but merely to call them into 
question by triggering renewed debate.156 But, who should decide when an Act “aims to 
reshape the social structure of the society”? Jorke’s solution is unpersuasive; simple majority 
vote by an additional deliberative body, chosen by lot from the socially disadvantaged, would 
result in a referendum.157 The problems in Meyers and Jorke’s proposals appear to be inherent 
to models of jurisdiction sharing: is there an alternative approach that allows ethno-cultural 
minorities to be heard (or even to decide for themselves) notwithstanding their demographic 
size? 
 
3.2 Extending Democracy beyond Aggregation 
Recognition that an equal opportunity to participate in the political process does not 
necessarily permit ethno-cultural minorities to shape their society by affecting law and policy 
under a system of majority rule, has led some democratic theorists to focus on shifting 
understandings about collective self-rule away from the aggregation of votes.158 Under 
aggregative decision-making systems, numerical minorities that constitute ascriptive 
marginalised groups will very likely become persistent electoral minorities, weakening both 
the legitimacy of the state and democracy’s commitment to self-rule. This understanding 
informs much of the “deliberative turn” in democratic theory,159 a more inclusive model that 
seeks to justify decisions primarily “on the sharing of reasons”,160 as well as Philip Pettit’s 
neo-republican model of freedom as non-domination.161 Each will be explored in turn. 
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3.2.1 Deliberative Democracy 
Central to deliberative democracy is the notion of equality. For Iris Marion Young, equality is 
a substantive requirement, primarily referring to the “full participation and inclusion” of all 
citizens in “society’s major institutions”.162 This open, participatory ethic flows from 
deliberative democrats’ view that the legitimacy of a decision depends not on an aggregation 
of votes, but “on the degree to which those affected by it have been included in the decision-
making processes and have had the opportunity to influence the outcomes.”163 An inclusive 
process of decision-making is predicated on a deliberation structured around “a free public 
reasoning among equals”,164 who advance their positions by “impartial”165 “appeal to the 
common will”,166 in a process intended to encourage otherwise marginalised voices to speak 
and be heard. Such a process has broadly expressive and symbolic goals in positioning each 
person as an equal deserving of respect, but also has epistemic justification in enlarging the 
pool of ideas with diverse perspectives, jettisoning poor arguments and building a consensus 
on the best solution.167 Even if consensus is not reached, deliberative democratic theorists 
contend that it leads to greater respect among participants.168 
 
In structuring deliberation around appeals to the common will, participants can defend their 
understanding or interpretation of the common good, but must do so only using norms “which 
all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses”.169 While this 
has an educative and moralistic function, in shaping citizens’ interests and identity towards 
the common good,170 its broader purpose is in creating an environment based on public reason 
and equality. Permitting persons to justify their arguments on premises over which essential 
disagreement exists would weaken the inclusive, deliberative process, denying its dialogical 
promise and potentially opening it up to abuse by demagogues.171 True to deliberative 
democrats’ strong understanding of equality, the state must create social conditions to develop 
each citizen’s capacities so that all have an equal capability to influence decisions,172 and 
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must ensure that unequal distributions of power and resources do not shape contributions 
during the deliberative process.173 The only force that is supposed to coerce individuals is “the 
force of the better argument”.174 
 
The fundamental features of the deliberative model (public equality, participation, inclusion 
and consensus) are attractive to ethno-cultural minorities, including Indigenous peoples.175 In 
reconceptualising democracy away from the aggregation of votes, the fact that these groups 
constitute a numerical minority is not necessarily determinative of the eventual decision. 
Second, in providing a space for all citizens to speak based on conditions of equality and 
reciprocity, deliberative democracy promises enhanced access to decision-making forums. 
Finally, in emphasising decisions based on public reason (informed by the participants’ 
unique perspectives), marginalised ascriptive groups may legitimately hope that a broader 
understanding of the common good, one that incorporates all (rather than merely a majority 
of) participants’ aspirations and demands, will prevail.  
 
Nonetheless, concerns surround both problematic assumptions underlying deliberative 
democracy and difficulties in securing truly deliberative processes in practice, limiting the 
benefit that it offers for marginalised ascriptive groups. The chief concern identified by 
difference theorists is the requirement that deliberation be structured around public reasoning 
based on appeals to the common good. This requirement privileges forms of reasoning not 
necessarily characteristic of ethno-cultural minorities, denying them the opportunity to utilize 
forms of communication they consider more appropriate, including rhetorical devices such as 
storytelling, or disruptive or disorderly actions.176 Although positioned as neutral then, 
deliberative democracy appears to force marginalised groups to enter the process on the terms 
of the dominant community. Young’s solution to this problem involves greater awareness of 
and attention to the disadvantages faced by marginalised groups within the “fair, open and 
inclusive democratic processes”,177 but it is not clear what this entails in practice. Does it 
involve greater opportunity for such groups to speak? Or allowance for Indigenous peoples, 
for example, to communicate in a manner they consider more appropriate?178  
 
Increasing the opportunity for marginalised groups to speak would involve diminishing 
deliberative democracy’s commitment to public equality as it would necessarily reduce time 
for others. The second option, however, appears beneficial, as it recognises that Indigenous 
peoples, for example, are differently situated and consequently structures the deliberative 
process in a way that encourages their continued participation. When combined with a 
commitment to listening on behalf of members of the dominant culture,179 recognising that 
diverse communicative strategies may satisfy the standard of ‘reasonableness’ accords with 
deliberative democracy’s ideals of inclusion and equality.180 And yet, this move unveils what 
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Melissa Williams refers to as the “contingency” of the “standard of reasonableness that lies at 
the heart of deliberative theory”,181 potentially derailing the entire process. A significant cause 
of disagreement between members of ethno-cultural minorities and members of the dominant 
culture centres on the judgment that particular arguments are reasonable or not. In the case of 
Indigenous peoples, this disagreement can be even starker. Many non-Indigenous Australians 
have difficulty conceptualising Indigenous Australians’ relationship to country and its role as 
the basis of cultural, spiritual and personal identity. In these circumstances, non-Indigenous 
Australians may consider that the traumatic consequences, including “loss of personal 
identity” Indigenous Australians feel when dispossessed,182 is ‘unreasonable’. Their views 
will not be taken seriously. Even putting to one side the likelihood that background 
inequalities will condition or skew the deliberative process,183 if this psychological gap cannot 
be bridged, it is difficult to see what deliberative democracy offers Indigenous peoples.  
 
One way out of this challenge might be to redefine the goals of deliberative democracy. More 
recent deliberative democrats have recognised that some forms of consensus will not, and 
need not, always be achieved.184 John Dryzek draws a typology of consensus to differentiate 
between consensus and meta-consensus. While normative consensus, for example, concerns 
agreement on the values that should predominate within a deliberation, normative meta-
consensus seeks mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the disputed values, without 
necessarily stretching to an agreement on which of the disputed values should receive 
priority.185 Drawing on psychological literature that suggests there is a high degree of 
agreement on the legitimacy of basic values,186 Dryzek argues that appropriately structured 
deliberative democracy may uncover agreement at the normative meta-consensus level. In 
terms of disputes over land and natural resources between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
peoples, it is likely that participants on both sides will recognise that such disputes need not 
be positioned in a zero-sum game. Dryzek’s normative meta-consensus “implies reciprocal 
understanding and recognition of the legitimacy of the values held by other participants in 
political interaction”.187  
 
Significantly, empirical studies suggest that with careful attention to structural dynamics, 
deliberative democracy can be effective in mediating the relationship between Indigenous and 
non-Indigenous peoples. James Fishkin describes a deliberative poll conducted in 2001 on 
issues concerning Indigenous Australians. Recognising the demographic problem, the poll 
oversampled Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, selecting 46 persons in addition to 
344 non-Indigenous Australians, randomly assigned to small groups of 10 to 25. Results 
indicate that deliberation greatly improved non-Indigenous Australians understanding of 
Indigenous concerns and support for Indigenous aspirations.188 This is positive and points to 
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the real possibilities of deliberative democracy in fomenting a style of public reasoning that is 
more receptive and sensitive to Indigenous peoples.  
 
The focus on reciprocity and dialogue are key elements in an effective deliberative 
democracy. Nevertheless, a number of questions surrounding feasibility remain. In particular, 
in light of the fact that political institutions generally remain far from the deliberative ideal, 
what institutions and processes are required to transform Fishkin’s “mini publics” into mass 
publics?189 And are institutions sufficient, or will broader cultural change be required? If so, 
how can this be accomplished?  
 
3.2.2 Institutionalising Contestation  
Elections may be the primary means of ensuring government is accountable to citizens, “but 
they are very unlikely to be sufficient”,190 as they fail to ensure that government action is 
directed by all citizens. Indeed, “Electoral fundamentalis[m]”191 offers little for ascriptive 
marginalised groups, as “it is difficult for minorities to register their dislike for government 
policy at the ballot box because it has no impact, and the majority do not have any self-
interest in the concerns of any particular minority”.192 Recognition of this fact has led some 
democratic theorists to delineate two modes in the representative relationship: identifying an 
election mode and a between-election mode.193 If persistent electoral minorities cannot 
succeed in influencing government action via the election mode, then mechanisms and 
processes that channel popular will, provide opportunities for political contestation, and 
promote interaction between the represented and the representatives should be devised for the 
between-election mode. This tradition is similar but distinct to technocratic democratic 
arrangements. Rather than excise issues to managerial bodies, decisions are still made via 
majoritarian institutions, but citizens are granted greater opportunity to contest those 
decisions, and have their voices heard.  
 
Robert Dahl is one theorist who understood the significance of contestation and non-electoral 
mechanisms for democratic theory. Dahl conceived of democracy as requiring “continuing 
responsiveness” by the government “to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political 
equals”.194 This shifts our view from irregular election dates to institutions and processes 
feeding interests and views back to government throughout the electoral cycle. This 
understanding is also present in Ian Shapiro’s account of democracy as the “structured 
competition for power”.195 For Shapiro, democracy works only when it is competitive because 
bipartisan politics masks domination.196 The privileging of thin accounts of democracy that 
equate it primarily to electoral control runs the risk of failing to recognise domination. In an 
excoriating essay lamenting the absence of Indigenous voices in policy making and public life 
in Australia, Megan Davis draws on Shapiro: 
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For Indigenous Australians the system is broken. When self-determination was 
abandoned it was replaced by a seemingly benign, upbeat and eternally co-
operative bipartisanship. But bipartisanship is deceptively simple. Intuitively it 
makes sense, but it does not always sit well in a parliamentary liberal 
democracy whose institutions are based on the mediation of disagreement. And 
when a policy area involves 2 per cent of twenty-three million people, it 
becomes a significant problem for the scrutiny of decisions between the ballot 
box.197 
 
Davis highlights the key element in a system of continuing responsiveness—scrutiny between 
the ballot box. Philip Pettit’s republican theory of government adopts a similar approach, 
though, rather than focusing on ‘responsiveness’, Pettit links freedom (and democracy) to 
non-domination and ‘contestation’. For Pettit, a government is democratic to the extent that 
“the people individually and collectively enjoy a permanent possibility of contesting”198 
government decisions. The problem posed by persistent electoral minorities, or “sticky 
minorities”, as Pettit terms them, is that their members will not have an equal chance at 
influence under electoral mechanisms.199 
 
The solution is to establish impartial institutions that “promise to give people a power of 
contesting what government does that parallels their collective power to determine who shall 
be in government”.200 But ensuring that every action of government is able to “be effectively 
contestable by those affected”,201 requires certain institutional structures, including: a 
potential basis for contestation; a channel available by which decisions may be contested; and 
a suitable forum for hearing contestations.202 The inclusive republic that Pettit envisages 
provides both a formal entitlement to individuals and groups to “speak out against” 
government policy, and a substantive guarantee that such groups can speak out in a way that 
is “liable to affect…proposed legislation”.203  
 
These contestatory structures operate at two levels. At the individual and collective level, 
Pettit envisages citizens as “resistance prone”.204 This places stringent demands on citizens, 
requiring them to take an active participation in civic and political life,205 and to remain 
vigilant in publicising and protecting their and others interests.206 The forum for contestation 
will include various processes, such as ombudsman, inquiries, and courts, enabling citizens to 
challenge governmental decisions and policies. But these bodies will only be effective if the 
government is “resistance-averse”,207 meaning it respects the process and funds the 
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institutions accordingly. For Pettit, this extends the substantive right to contest beyond 
external interventions such as protests, petitions or claims, and includes equitable 
representation within the legislature, bureaucracy and judiciary.208 While the question of 
proportional representation and reserved seats will be addressed in detail in Part III.C, it is 
clear that this reform offers marginalised ascriptive groups a real opportunity to challenge 
government as well as influence legislation and policy.209 
 
This is not to say, however, that Pettit’s vision does not also contain troubling elements. John 
McCormick avers that Pettit’s institutions are too weak, arguing that contestation does not 
provide real accountability and therefore fails to ensure an effective voice for minority 
groups.210 Conversely, even if the proliferation of institutions promoting contestation prevents 
majority domination, it also tends to sclerotize decision-making, which will likely privilege 
the status quo, preventing changes to benefit minority groups.211 Second, and perhaps more 
problematically, institutional structures that provide a forum for contestation are one thing, 
but to be effective they require individuals to utilise them. For marginalised individuals, 
seeking review of a government decision can entail significant burdens.212 It is unrealistic to 
expect such groups take on Pettit’s Herculean role, securing their freedom from domination 
by contesting each and every administrative action.  
 
While Pettit anticipates that his ideal citizenry may be regarded as overly optimistic, and 
acknowledges that a more “plausible means” to monitor and control government is 
required,213 his solution, which shares commonalities with deliberative democracy,214 suffers 
similar difficulties. Pettit argues that republican deliberation should be guided by a norm that 
participants must base their arguments on considerations “all can regard as relevant”.215 Of 
course, disagreement will likely “always remain in place”, and it is, therefore, necessary at 
some point to achieve resolution by voting,216 but, so long as participants interact in this 
manner, the shared policy-making norms (e.g. equality, respect) will influence and shape 
candidate policies over the long term. Unsurprisingly, this approach has been criticised as 
idealistic.217  
 
Nonetheless, Pettit’s republican focus on freedom as non-domination, rather than non-
interference, is useful for thinking about the problem of ascriptive marginalised groups who 
are in a non-dominant position relative to the majority society and its agencies. Although the 
majority community may never interfere, its capacity to do so, suggests that the minority are 
not truly free. Pettit encourages thinking critically about developing institutions, processes, 
and mechanisms that provide opportunities for ethno-cultural minorities to contest 
government action, but does so in a way that does not impose unrealistic burdens on them. As 
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government responsiveness is tied to contestation,218 this approach will likely enhance the 
ability of members of these groups to have their interests reflected in the processes of 
government, helping to realise democracy’s commitment to collective rule.  
 
3.3 Enhancing the Value of Voting Power 
 
The previous section examined how democratic theorists have adopted and adapted non-
electoral mechanisms to protect and promote the interests of marginalised ascriptive groups. 
An alternative approach involves working within electoral mechanisms, but amending the 
structure and operation of majoritarian democracy, to ensure meaningful access to the “forum 
where public policy is finally fashioned”.219 Four related institutional forms will be explored: 
plural voting, drawing electoral boundaries to enhance the ability of ethno-cultural minorities 
to elect candidates of their choice, proportional representation, and reserved seats. While each 
of these methods differs in significant ways, and consequently, their justifications rest on 
distinct normative grounds,220 they are all drawn from the same idea: political decisions are 
legitimate to the extent that the position of each citizen—including the minority—is 
considered equally,221 and this requires “that they be adequately and effectively 
represented”.222 In other words, democracy requires all of the people, not just a majority, to 
rule collectively.  
 
3.3.1 Plural Votes  
Concerned about the position of numerical minorities under electoral democracies, some 
democratic theorists have explored the concept of providing additional votes to minority 
subgroups within the state. These approaches have generally not been developed to assist 
marginalised ascriptive groups, but to achieve other important democratic goals, such as more 
accurately reflecting the intensity of interests at stake,223 or realising the putative right to a 
competent government.224 Nonetheless, the logic in some formulations may translate.225 
Historically, democracy has privileged certain subgroups within a state by restricting suffrage. 
Plural voting is similar, but conceptually distinct, as advocates generally accept the premise 
that all citizens should receive a vote, thus agreeing that political decisions are legitimate only 
if everyone affected has an equal opportunity to participate.226 The question, of course, is how 
many opportunities each person might have. 
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John Stuart Mill has provided the most significant justification for plural votes. Mill’s 
argument for plural voting rested on his understanding of the purpose of government. For 
Mill, “a government is to be judged…by…its tendency to improve or deteriorate the people 
themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and by means of 
them”.227 Government thus has an educative and protective function.228 It must educate its 
citizens in “intellectual, practical, and moral”229 senses while serving the interests of the entire 
community. Mill argued that a plural voting regime that favours educated peoples will 
produce better outcomes because those receiving additional votes have “greater capacity for 
the management of the [community’s] joint interests”.230 In contrast, an egalitarian voting 
system would mean “the great majority of voters…would be manual labourers”, and 
correspondingly, the danger of “class legislation”,231 by which Mill meant “sinister” and 
“selfish” partial interests at odds with the common good,232 “would still exist in a very 
perilous degree”.233 Mill accepted that “it is a personal injustice” to deny a person the 
“ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the 
same interest as other people”. He thus considered that each person should have “his opinion 
counted at its worth”, though, as he made clear, “not at more than its worth”.234 Anticipating 
critiques, Mill contended that “no one but a fool” would feel offended by his proposal because 
all accept that there are others whose opinion “is entitled to a greater amount of 
consideration” than theirs.235  
 
Democratic theorists have challenged Mill’s position from a variety of angles. Charles Beitz 
has dismissed Mill’s belief that only a fool would feel unfairly treated, arguing that political 
inequities, including unequal voting power, are “unfair to those whom it disadvantages”, and 
will diminish the self-esteem of individuals when the inequities reflect other societal 
cleavages.236 Even if Mill’s scheme produced superior outcomes (and having a tertiary 
education does not necessarily make one politically competent),237 Beitz considers therefore 
that the political inequalities that it rests on should lead to its rejection. Further, even if one 
accepts Mill’s assumption that a well-educated population may tend to rule more wisely, 
David Estlund argues that it does not follow that they should be granted additional political 
power. Estlund’s “demographic objection” recognises education is intimately tied to social, 
economic, and racial privileges, meaning that the educated portion of the population “may 
disproportionally have epistemically damaging features that countervail the admitted 
epistemic benefits of education”.238 While educated people may be more likely to rule in the 
common good, if only a small subset of the population is educated, “it is very likely that they 
do systematically share certain interests” and will, therefore, favour those interests.239  
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The demographic objection to plural voting is persuasive, but the democratic one is 
determinative. Political decisions are legitimate only to the extent that everyone affected has 
the opportunity to participate equally; denying that by providing greater opportunities for 
some, defeats the very essence of democracy.240 Nonetheless, it is significant that although 
Mill did not seek to justify plural voting by reference to marginalised ascriptive minorities, 
his analysis can translate. For Mill, plural voting is a response to the ‘infirmities and dangers’ 
of representative government;241 a danger that is all too real for members of such groups, who 
are often the victims of partial interests at odds with a more broadly-conceived common good. 
Can this danger be ameliorated in a manner that “advance[s] democratic aspirations”?242  
 
3.3.2 Redistricting 
In almost all democracies, electorates are territorially delimited.243 These boundaries are, 
however, “not merely arbitrary lines drawn on a map”, but “almost always…are cognizant of 
geography and demography”.244 The practice is widespread: a largescale comparative survey 
of electoral boundary delimitation found 19 of 60 countries that delimit electorate boundaries, 
require their boundary authority to consider “communities of interest”.245 Communities of 
interest can be conceived of in either geographic or likeminded dimensions. For example, 
groups living alongside a river or on one side of a mountain may share particular interests 
because they are a community, while groups with a similar political outlook or socioeconomic 
status, perhaps based on employment in a large mine, may form a community because of their 
shared interests.246 Of course, these dimensions are fluid and intersect: it is often impossible 
(and unnecessary) to tell whether one or the other is primary. Significantly, for territorially 
concentrated marginalised ascriptive groups, a community of interest criterion, means that 
electoral boundary commissions may draw electorates to maximise the group’s opportunity to 
elect candidates of their choice. 
 
Relevant communities of interest are context dependent. In the United States state of 
Alabama, legislative guidelines instruct the Permanent Joint Legislative Committee on 
Redistribution to “respect” the integrity of communities of interest. These are defined as 
including but not limited to “racial, ethnic, geographic, governmental, regional, social, 
cultural, partisan, or historic interests; county, municipal, or voting precinct boundaries; and 
commonality of communications”.247 In Canada, the Supreme Court has confirmed that 
“factors like geography, community history, community interests and minority 
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representation” may need to be taken into account.248 Electoral boundaries in Australia are 
delimited by the Redistribution Committee, an apolitical body consisting of the Australian 
Electoral Commissioner, and the relevant State or Territory’s Australian Electoral Officer, 
Surveyor General and Auditor General.249 Subject to a rough equality in voting power,250 the 
Redistribution Committee “shall give consideration” to communities of interests, defined to 
include “economic, social and regional interests”, within the proposed division.251  
 
In the United States, political ideology is relevant for electoral districting.252 As a result of 
extreme racially-polarised voting, the 1990s saw a proliferation of majority-minority 
redistricting. Majority-minority districts are electorates where an ethno-cultural group (or 
groups) constitutes the majority of the electorate’s population. In many cases, majority-
minority districts are created to avoid or remedy violations of the Voting Rights Act 1965 
prohibition on drawing electoral boundaries in order to diminish the ability of a racial or 
linguistic minority to elect candidates of their choice,253 a legacy of severe racial 
discrimination in many parts of the country. The creation of these seats was intended to 
ensure that such minorities are represented in the legislature in proportion to their population 
size, and led to a significant increase in representation of minority candidates.254 
 
Delimiting electoral boundaries by communities of interest may be a historical accident,255 
but it offers clear advantages for representative democracy. Indeed, empirical research 
suggests that it can diversify the viewpoints considered at the deliberative stage,256 as well as 
enhance citizen involvement in politics,257 and potentially perform an educative function in 
developing citizens’ capacities.258 These twin benefits are drawn from the fact that this 
approach guarantees that significant minority groups will not be substantially impaired in 
electing representatives of their choice,259 ensuring that these groups have their voices heard 
in the processes of government, and making the “representative’s task of articulating the 
interests of his or her constituents easier”.260  
 
Nevertheless, a number of problems exist with this institutional mechanism. First, while 
guaranteeing the presence of a candidate of the minority group’s choice in the legislature, the 
value of redistricting is questionable. Gerrymandering can dilute the value of minority votes 
by dividing minorities into several electorates (‘cracking’), or over concentrating minorities 
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into one electorate (‘stacking’ and ‘packing’).261 In majority-minority electorates, this process 
wastes minority votes; in super-majority group electorates, it absolves representatives from 
needing to earn votes of ethno-cultural minorities, leading them to pay less attention to 
minority interests.262 Second, and more problematically, redistricting merely shifts the 
majority-minority schism from the electorate to the legislature. Absent a culture of reasoned 
deliberation, the majority may enact procedural amendments to weaken the ability of the 
minority to exercise equal power within the representative assembly.  
 
Third, while redistricting is not necessarily limited to sizeable numerical minorities, such 
groups must reach a certain threshold before this mechanism will be effective.263 In Australia, 
the Constitution entrenches significant discrepancies in voting power in both the House of 
Representatives,264 and the Senate.265 Drawing on these sections, the High Court has 
confirmed that the right to vote does not require an equally powerful vote.266 Equally, in 
Canada, the Supreme Court has accepted considerable variations in population of ridings 
between and within provinces.267 In the most recent federal election, for example, Niagara 
Falls, Ontario had over 2.4 times the number of electors as Kenora, Ontario.268 Nonetheless, it 
is clear that redistricting privileges spatially defined groups and offers little for territorially 
dispersed ethno-cultural minorities. Perhaps proportional representation offers a fairer 
alternative.  
 
3.3.3 Proportional Representation 
The redistricting process examined above takes for granted geographically defined groups as 
the basis of electoral representation. But in accepting communities of interests as relevant to 
redistricting, electoral systems acknowledge that representation can be based upon other types 
of groups. Significantly, because single-member territorial electorates can subsume minority 
interests, geography “may not be the most salient characteristic on which to base group 
representation”.269 Many democratic theorists therefore advocate proportional representation 
(PR) in multi-member electorates as an alternative to single-member territorially-based 
electorates; John Stuart Mill, for example, considered that “all interests or classes of any 
importance” should have a voice in the representative assembly.270 While it is fair that the 
majority should outvote and prevail over the minority (Mill did not advocate granting veto 
power to minority groups), no substantial group or interest in society should be denied the 
opportunity to express its view. For Mill, ensuring that “every opinion which exists in the 
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constituencies” is heard in deliberation, ensures that decisions which command the greatest 
respect of “all” are reached.271  
 
PR aims to achieve this in a manner consistent with democratic equality. As noted above, 
plural voting regimes treat citizens unequally by distributing suffrage inequitably. In contrast, 
proportional voting systems treat citizens equally by distributing suffrage equally: all citizens 
have the same number of votes, and the legislative body reflects “the range of opinions and 
interests within the public at large”.272 Simply, if 15 per cent of the electorate support a 
particular political party, that party should receive roughly 15 per cent of seats; “the majority 
should enjoy a majority of the power, but the minority should also enjoy some power too”.273  
 
Proportional and semi-proportional representation systems are common throughout the 
world.274 Although there is considerable institutional variety, the two most common 
approaches are Party List PR and Single Transferable Vote (STV). Under the former system, 
parties make lists of candidates and parties win seats in proportion to the number of votes they 
receive. In closed lists, the party fixes the order in which the candidates will be assigned seats; 
in open list systems, electors may indicate preference among the candidates. In contrast, under 
STV systems, electors allocate one vote to each candidate, but each voter may register an 
ordinal preference ranking of candidates. While Party List PR and STV are most common, 
various alternative arrangements exist. One controversial semi-proportional voting system has 
been proposed by Lani Guinier: cumulative voting.  
 
Cumulative voting is a multiple-winner voting system intended to promote more proportional 
representation than winner-take-all elections. Similarly, to ordinary proportional voting, rather 
than ‘one person, one vote’, cumulative voting adopts the principle of ‘one person, n votes’, 
where n is the number of representatives to be elected. Unlike STV, however, cumulative 
voting allows electors to indicate the intensity of their preferences, by ‘cumulating’ or 
‘plumping’ all of their votes for one candidate. That is, if there are 12 seats available, electors 
can choose to vote for 12 separate candidates, to give six votes each to two candidates, or give 
12 votes to one candidate. As Guinier explains, this system allows politically cohesive 
marginalised ascriptive groups to pool their votes to secure the election of a representative 
that reflects their interests.275  
 
While Guinier’s proposal is divisive, proportional or semi-proportional representation offers a 
number of advantages over geographically defined electorates. First, as proportional 
representation is interest-based, it allows voters to self-define their identities and 
constituencies, minimising the number of votes “wasted” by being cast in safe-seats.276 For 
marginalised ascriptive groups, the interest-based nature of proportional representation does 
not lock individuals into a minority identity,277 or require the state to single out minorities for 
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“special protection”,278 as redistricting, plural voting regimes, or reserved seats do. Secondly, 
empirically, political scientists have demonstrated that proportional representation can 
enhance the presence of dispersed ethno-cultural minorities in the representative assembly,279 
though evidence is inconsistent over whether this extends to enhancing representation of 
concentrated minority groups.280 Quite apart from the fact that heterogeneous decision-
making bodies make better decisions,281 this accords with the democratic ideal of equal 
influence and control.282 Finally, unlike plural voting systems, proportional representation 
achieves this outcome in a manner consistent with democratic equality.  
 
Proportional and semi-proportional electoral systems provide ethno-cultural minorities with a 
greater opportunity to elect a representative of their choice. However, a fundamental problem 
remains. As the justice of these systems lies within a “claim of quantitative accuracy”283 these 
electoral systems offer little for extreme minorities whose population size does not easily 
translate into a presence in the legislature, or minorities dispersed across political subunits. 
Paradoxically, these marginalised ascriptive groups may be most at risk from a domineering 
(or even respectful) persistent electoral majority. For these groups, a different electoral system 
is required.  
 
3.3.4 Reserved Seats  
The three mechanisms adopted above aim at ensuring members of marginalised ascriptive 
groups have an opportunity to elect a representative of their choice. Reserved seats go one 
step further, by ensuring that members of these groups are able to do this. This is not a rare 
institutional choice; more than thirty countries reserve seats in their national parliaments for 
representatives of ethno-cultural minorities.284 There are significant variations in design; 
reserved seats may be filled through competitive election in specially created districts, 
through election by voters registered on separate rolls, by group members receiving more 
votes in general elections, or through designation by political parties.285 The New Zealand 
model, for example, utilises two electoral rolls: a general roll and a Māori roll. Any person 
who identifies as being of Māori descent can elect to be placed on the Māori roll. Every five 
years, all registered Māori electors have the opportunity to choose whether to be included on 
the Māori or general roll. Following finalisation, the number of Māori electorates is 
determined so that each electorate is roughly equivalent to that of a general seat. In the most 
recent election, 7 Māori seats were established (out of 71). While 7 seats does not reflect the 
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proportion of New Zealanders who identify as being of Māori descent (approximately 15 per 
cent), not all Māori’s elect to enrol on the Māori roll.  
 
Mirna Jusic and Nenad Stojanovic contend that there are two democratic justifications for 
reserved seats.286 On the one hand, liberal multiculturalists make a normative argument that 
ethno-cultural minorities should be guaranteed representation to ameliorate legacies of 
discrimination and marginalisation,287 or because fairer descriptive representation will 
increase their “context of choice”,288 and ensure they are heard equally in political 
decisions.289 On the other hand sit pragmatic arguments, which see reserved seats as 
improving the quality of democratic decisions,290 or as necessary to promote stability in 
multiethnic states.291 Nonetheless, many theorists question whether reserved seats achieve 
these benefits. Pragmatically, concerns abound particularly over imposing group identity and 
ossifying lines of group cleavage, potentially entrenching intergroup conflict.292 Normatively, 
others suggest that reserved seats may distort the democratic principle of one-person, one-
vote.293 On the first point, as many scholars have argued, group recognition does not foment 
cleavages but acknowledges their existence within the community. By giving voice to 
minority groups, it is hoped that more equitable decision-making will be reached. The 
normative arguments are also unpersuasive. As the previous sections have illustrated, 
electoral systems already depart from strict equality of voting power in order to protect 
communities of interests, and including representatives of all politically relevant groups is a 
normatively desirable goal that aspires to the democratic ideal of collective self-rule.294 
 
Reserved seats are potentially particularly advantageous for marginalised ascriptive groups as 
they present the opportunity for members of such groups to “set the agenda”.295 Indeed, in her 
examination of “the politics of presence”, Anne Phillips has noted that the real value of 
presence lies in the way it may “transform the political agenda” by expanding the range of 
ideas and rendering visible what was invisible.296 While we must be careful not to fall into 
naïve essentialism that equates shared experience with shared belief,297 experiences are 
formative and the views and interests of marginalised groups may be inaccessible to members 
of the dominant community.298 Significantly, legislators elected through reserved seats, rather 
than intraparty quotas, may operate independent of political parties, reducing partisan 
constraints and enhancing the opportunity for collaboration.299 Encouragingly, limited 
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empirical evidence suggests reserved seats have a positive, though modest, effect in 





Majority rule may be the “least bad” method for resolving disagreements within a society,301 
but undifferentiated majoritarianism entails real risks for marginalised ascriptive groups. 
Thankfully then, while majority rule is a central element of democracy, democracy is more 
than majority rule. Democracy is collective self-rule. It requires institutional forms that ensure 
all citizens, whether members of a dominant ethno-cultural community or not, have an 
opportunity to be heard in the processes of government. That is, to have a say in government 
in a manner that allows them to impose a direction on that government.  
 
This paper has provided a taxonomy of legal and political institutional arrangements and 
processes aimed at providing numerical minorities who constitute marginalised ascriptive 
groups, with the capacity to have their interests heard in the processes of government. These 
arrangements differ in form, ranging from attempts to insulate minority interests from 
decisions of the majority, reconceptualising democracy away from preference aggregation, or 
amending the machinery of majoritarian processes to enhance the ability of ethno-cultural 
minorities to elect representatives of their choice. Notwithstanding these distinctions, each 
approach is grounded in a conception of democracy as “government for the people, not for a 
majority of the people”, and a belief that “a minority has a right to have its losses taken into 
account”.302 This democratic position is reflected in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 1998 
decision Reference re Secession of Quebec, a complex case—and one identified by Hirschl as 
an element of “judicialisation of mega-politics”303—concerning the political relationship of a 
ethno-cultural minority and majority: 
 
A democratic system of government is committed to considering those 
dissenting voices, and seeking to acknowledge and address those voices in the 
laws by which all in the community must live.304 
 
Liberal democratic states’ failure to hear the concerns of their constituents has presaged a 
recent drift towards authoritarian nationalism. In setting out institutional arrangements aimed 
at realising democracy’s promise, it is hoped that constitutional lawyers, democratic theorists, 
and policy makers will reimagine political and legal processes and mechanisms that enable all 
citizens to be heard in the processes of government. This has great potential to assist with the 
resolution of recurrent problems across the globe.  
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